In 2002, I completed my master's thesis at Eastern Mediterranean University. The subject: a Video on Demand-based distance learning system. Three years before YouTube was founded, five years before Netflix switched to streaming.
The system worked. We could stream video using TCP, UDP, and RDUP (Reliable UDP)—a protocol I designed myself. Students could add content at specific timestamps on videos—a feature that YouTube still doesn't have today. It was published by IEEE. Academic success: check.
Did I commercialize it? No.
Because doing video streaming in 2002 Turkey meant astronomical bandwidth costs. Providing a 500 Kbps video stream to a single user was economic suicide in Turkey at that time. The same year, the same technology, in the Netherlands or the US—the story could have been very different.
This article asks whether the same structural problem persists 20 years later. Spoiler: It does.
What Is an IXP and Why Does It Matter?
An Internet Exchange Point (IXP) is a physical location where different networks exchange traffic directly with each other. Without an IXP, a user in Istanbul trying to reach a server also in Istanbul might have to route through Frankfurt.
A properly functioning IXP ecosystem means:
- Low latency: Traffic stays local
- Low cost: Peering instead of transit
- High reliability: Multiple connection options
Let's look at AMS-IX in Amsterdam: 901 networks, participants from 70 countries, 14 Tbps peak traffic. DE-CIX in Frankfurt: 1,100+ networks, 18+ Tbps traffic.
What's the situation in Turkey?
Turkey's IXP Desert
DE-CIX Istanbul—yes, operated by the same German company running the massive exchange in Frankfurt—hosts only 69 networks and 377 Gbps peak traffic. One-fiftieth of Frankfurt.
The local initiative TR-IX (Turkish Internet Exchange) is even more modest: 14 networks, total 295 Gbps port capacity.
These numbers might be normal for a small European country. But Turkey is a G20 nation with 85 million people and a $1 trillion economy.
The real problem isn't the numbers. The real problem is who isn't there.
The Elephant in the Room: Türk Telekom
A quote from RIPE NCC's November 2023 Turkey report:
"The lack of influence of DE-CIX is noticeable... As the dominant provider in the country, [Türk Telekom's] absence clearly has a major effect on the state of local peering."
Türk Telekom, controlling 56% of the fixed broadband market, is not present at any Turkish IXP with its domestic network. Turkcell Superonline and Vodafone are present at DE-CIX Istanbul, but with "selective" or "restrictive" peering policies—meaning they don't exchange traffic with competitors.
Why? Because the current structure works in their favor.
When Türk Telekom refuses to do open peering, competitors are forced to either pay transit fees or use expensive international routes. The company profits from a transit-based revenue model that settlement-free peering would eliminate.
Historical Poisoning
In Turkey's early internet days, the three major ISPs exchanged traffic not locally but via transatlantic routes through the US. When one ISP volunteered to host an exchange point, it exploited this position to market itself as "the center of the Turkish Internet," gaining an unfair competitive advantage.
This incident poisoned the collaborative model that made Amsterdam and Frankfurt successful. Since that day, trust between major players has never been reestablished.
Monopoly by the Numbers
The Turkish telecom market operates as a tight oligopoly:
Provider | Fixed Broadband Share | Infrastructure Control |
|---|---|---|
Türk Telekom/TTNET | 55-56% | 77% of fiber |
Turkcell Superonline | ~15% | Leases TT infrastructure |
Vodafone Turkey | ~10% | Leases TT infrastructure |
Others | ~20% | Must use incumbent infrastructure |
Türk Telekom owns 496,000 km of fiber—more than all competitors combined (89,000 km). Alternative ISPs like TurkNet, D-Smart, and Millenicom exist, but they must use Türk Telekom's last-mile infrastructure to reach customers.
According to RIPE NCC analysis, 64% of Turkish networks connect to only ONE other network—an extraordinarily high single-homing rate compared to 40% in the Czech Republic or 24% in Poland.
Why Amsterdam Succeeded
Amsterdam's advantage began in 1988—the Netherlands became the second country to connect to the internet, after the US. In 1994, AMS-IX was founded as a neutral, non-profit association owned by its members.
This governance model eliminated the competitive gaming that poisoned Turkey's early attempts.
The cost comparison reveals the competitive gap:
Element | Amsterdam/Frankfurt | Turkey (Estimated) |
|---|---|---|
IP transit (100 GigE) | $0.05/Mbps | $0.15-0.25/Mbps |
Networks available at IXP | 1,000+ | ~120 |
Effective bandwidth cost | ~$5/Mbps | ~$15-20/Mbps |
Amsterdam data centers offer access to 20 carrier-neutral facilities and 2,000+ network service providers. Equinix facilities in Istanbul connect to approximately 120 networks—15 times fewer options.
Why Aren't Hyperscalers in Turkey?
Turkey is one of the top 10 largest economies without an AWS, Azure, or Google Cloud region. Only Huawei Cloud has a dedicated region in Istanbul.
This is no coincidence. Hyperscalers build where infrastructure economics favor them:
- Dense peering ecosystem for low-latency content delivery ✗
- Reliable, competitive energy pricing ✗
- Carrier-neutral data center options △
- Predictable regulatory environment ✗
- Critical mass of enterprise customers ✓
Turkey fails on multiple criteria. Data center construction costs run $8-9 million per MW—30% higher than European averages. Energy prices rose 20% in 2023 alone.
For AWS or Google, serving Turkish customers from Frankfurt with 30-50ms latency makes more economic sense than building local infrastructure.
From 2002 to 2024: What Changed?
When I did my master's thesis in 2002, video streaming in Turkey was economically impossible. Bandwidth costs killed any consumer application.
22 years later, the structural problem remains the same:
- Turkish tech companies pay 20-40% higher infrastructure costs compared to European competitors
- Unicorns like Getir, Trendyol, and Insider use hybrid hosting strategies, running significant infrastructure from European regions
- Bulutistan, Turkey's leading cloud provider, expanded to Frankfurt, London, and Thessaloniki specifically to offer customers international connectivity
Internet access costs Turkish consumers 3.10% of minimum wage—compare that to 1.70% in Germany or 1.81% in France.
The Lesson of My VoD Thesis
I sometimes look at my VoD project still sitting on GitHub. One of the features I designed in 2002—allowing students to add rich content at specific timestamps on videos—still doesn't exist on any major platform today.
The technology was ready. The vision was there. It was published by IEEE.
But geography determined destiny.
If I had been in the Netherlands or the US, maybe I'd be telling a very different story now. Maybe I'd be writing this as "how I built my video streaming company."
Instead, 20 years later, I'm still analyzing the same structural problems. And every tech entrepreneur in Turkey, whether they realize it or not, pays the same invisible tax.
What Can Be Done?
The solution isn't technical—it's a matter of political economy. Dominant ISPs benefit from the current structure. Centralized traffic architecture serves surveillance requirements. The regulatory environment has been shaped toward incumbent protection rather than open competition.
Realistic change probably requires:
- Hyperscaler pressure: AWS/Azure/Google conditioning investment on infrastructure improvements
- EU alignment requirements: Open peering mandates as part of trade negotiations
- Technical community development: TurkNOG was revived in 2023 after years dormant; more must follow
- Independent regulatory authority: BTK insulated from political control
Without structural intervention, Turkey's internet infrastructure will continue to optimize for incumbent preservation rather than competitive efficiency.
And Turkish tech companies will continue to pay the price for that choice.